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THE ICJ: ON ITS OWN
EDWARD GORDON*
"[A]n institution, once established, acquires a life of its own,
independent of the elements which have given birth to it, and it must
develop, not in accordance with the views of those who created it, but in
accordance with the requirements of international life."I
I am honored and pleased to contribute to this Festschrift for Ved
Nanda. It was at Ved's invitation, four decades ago, that I contributed
some thoughts to the very first issue of the Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy. 2 They concerned the International Court
of Justice's abrupt and highly unpopular dismissal of a suit brought by
Ethiopia and Liberia challenging the legality of the application of South
Africa's apartheid policy in South West Africa, a territory South Africa
administered pursuant to a League of Nations Mandate. In what was
expected to be the merits phase of the litigation, the Court had
reversed, or seemed to reverse, a ruling it had made four years earlier
in the suit's preliminary objections phase, this time holding that the
Applicants had not established that their legal rights in the
administration of the Mandate were sufficient to constitute a cause of
action. 3
The earlier ruling had been obtained by a slim margin: eight to
seven. 4 Its reversal came on a seven to seven tie vote, broken, pursuant
to the Court's Statute,5 by the casting (i.e., second) vote of the Court's
President, Sir Percy Spender. Judge Spender had been in the minority
in the earlier phase, co-authoring a joint dissenting opinion with Judge
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice. The minority in the first phase of the litigation
* Honorary Vice President, American Branch of the International Law Association. LL.B.
Yale, Dipl. Int'l L., Cambridge.
1. Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, at 68 (May 28) (separate opinion of Judge Alvarez).
2. Edward Gordon, Old Orthodoxies Amid New Experiences: The South West Africa
(Namibia) Litigation and the Uncertain Jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice, 1 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 65 (1971).
3. South West Africa Cases, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 6, 61 (July 18).
4. South West Africa Cases, Preliminary Objections, 1962 I.C.J. 319 (Dec. 21).
5. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 55(2), June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S.
993.
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became the majority in the second in large part because two judges who
had been in the majority the first time were prevented by illness from
participating thereafter, and a third was forced to recuse himself from
participating in the second phase because of the partisanship implicit in
his having been appointed as ad hoc judge by the Applicants prior to
being elected to the Court as a regular member.
Dismissal of the Applicants' claim did not speak to the merits of the
case against apartheid, only to the Applicants' right to sue. Other than
among lawyers and legal scholars, though, the distinction was too
subtle to matter. What mattered was that the World Court had ruled in
favor of South Africa and against opponents of apartheid. Not to reach
the merits of the dispute meant leaving the status quo unchanged, with
the effect magnified, in this instance, by the ability of the respondent
state's friends to block effective remedial action by the UN's political
organs.
More than the Applicants themselves, and by extension critics of
apartheid, it was the Court itself, and by extension international law,
that had lost. The ruling came at a critical moment in history.
Colonialism was coming to its end. African colonies in particular had
gained independence with spectacular speed and decisiveness. The case
had been expected to demonstrate to newly independent states, and to
their citizens, that the procedures and institutions of traditional
international law could be used to promote their distinctive goals in
international life.6 Instead, it left the impression that international law
was in cahoots with the past, with the prerogatives of inherited power,
and in this instance with white supremacy. That the two judges seen to
be principally responsible for the suit's dismissal - Spender and
Fitzmaurice - were of Australian and British nationality, respectively,
only reinforced this impression. Both the Court and international law
were seen to be on the wrong side of history - and humanity.
Some observers wondered if members of the Court had been
influenced by adverse reaction to its Certain Expenses opinion,7 issued
the same year as its ruling in the preliminary objections phase of the
South West Africa case. The Certain Expenses opinion had raised - or
renewed - suspicion in some quarters that the Court was interpreting
its position as the UN's "principal judicial organ"8 to mean that it was
under an obligation to cooperate with the UN's political organs, rather
than to act as an independent court of law. Could the Court's
subsequent dismissal of Ethiopia and Liberia's claim have been
6. See Richard A. Falk, The South West Africa Cases: An Appraisal, 21 INT'L ORG. 1,
1 (1967).
7. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July
20).
8. U.N. Charter art. 92.
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influenced by a feeling that it might be better to not decide the case at
all than to be seen as deciding it solely to associate the Court with a
politically popular cause?
The impression that the Court had become beholden to UN politics
was enhanced in 1971, when the UN Security Council gave the Court
an opportunity to redeem itself, politically, by requesting from it an
advisory opinion on the compatibility of the application of apartheid in
South West Africa with international legal obligations. 9 The Council
had already expressed its own views on this subject, leaving the Court
in the position of either agreeing with the Council's opinion or openly
defying it. It agreed, deciding by a vote of thirteen to two that South
Africa was under a legal obligation to end its administration of South
West Africa,10 and by a vote of eleven to four that members of the UN
were under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's
continuing presence there and the invalidity of acts it undertook on
behalf of the territory. 11
Technically, its opinion in 1971 was not inconsistent with its
dismissal of Ethiopia and Liberia's suit five years earlier. The
questions on which its opinion was requested did not relate to standing.
But if in 1966 the Court appeared to be an agent of the past, then in
1971 it seemed to be kowtowing to UN politics, getting itself back on the
right track politically, but at considerable cost to its credibility as an
independent decision process. 12
Much of my article recounted this history. 13 But its main thrust
was directed less at the litigation itself than at the legal community's
reaction to it - not so much its revulsion against the support the Court
seemed to have given apartheid in 1966, or its apparent obeisance to
the Security Council in 1971, but rather the assumption that in neither
instance had the Court acted independently of all political
considerations, as a court of law should do. It was a reaction that
seemed to me to assume the existence of relatively stable expectations
about courts of law as adjudicative institutions. Specifically, it assumed
that courts are homogeneous, sui generis, regardless of differences
among them in formal structure or in the patterns of interaction with
contending social processes that empirically determine how they direct
their institutional energies. I found these assumptions unjustified, both
logically and empirically.
9. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 June 21.
10. Id. 118.
11. Id. 119.
12. See STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-24 (2011).
13. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 72-91.
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A LEGACY OF AMBIGUITY
Here in the United States, attitudes towards the ICJ as an
institution have tended to assume that it was created in the image of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was, indeed, the
prototype of an international tribunal that the American delegation
proposed when the idea of establishing a permanent international court
was first discussed at the diplomatic level, in 1907, at the second Hague
Peace Conference.14 In its idealized form, which is how it was
presented to the Conference and to the public, the proposed tribunal's
function was to have been simply that of applying existing principles of
international law to the facts of an international dispute, as it found
them, let the chips fall where they may.
Its advocates argued that the Supreme Court model's suitability to
the international arena had been demonstrated by its success in
deciding disputes between the states of the American union. 15 Though
less than sovereign in an international sense, the American states were
every bit as protective of their presumed prerogatives as sovereign
states were. If the Supreme Court could settle their disputes, why
could ones like it not be equally successful in resolving disputes
between sovereign nations?
In retrospect it is easy to recognize that the enthusiasm its
advocates brought to the proposal may have struck some delegates as
parochial, if not downright arrogant. Institutions like the Supreme
Court were not invariably found in other national legal systems.
Doubters were disinclined in any event to find merit in the misgivings
the Americans expressed about the more traditional model of
international arbitration, whose principal mission was understood to be
that of settling disputes by finding diplomatic solutions, taking law into
consideration but not attributing to it a deciding quality.16
To the Americans, the difference between the two approaches was
critical. In his instructions to the American delegation Secretary of
State Elihu Root had written:
It has been a very general practice of arbitrators to act, not as
judges deciding questions of fact and law upon the record before them
under a sense of judicial responsibility, but as negotiators effecting
settlement of the questions brought before them in accordance with the
traditions and usages and subject to all the considerations and
influences which affect diplomatic agents. The two methods are
radically different, proceed upon different standards of honorable
14. See EL1HU ROOT, MEN AND POLICIES: ADDRESSES 325-26 (Robert Bacon & James
Brown Scott eds., 1925).
15. See JAMES BROWN SCOTT, SOVEREIGN STATES AND SUITS 40-41 (1925).
16. See id. at 245.
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obligation, and frequently lead to widely differing results. It very
frequently happens that a nation which would be very willing to submit
its differences to an impartial judicial determination is unwilling to
submit them to this kind of diplomatic process. 17
To lawyers outside the United States, however, the distinction did
not appear to be of great moment; Root's argument gained little traction
at the Conference.18 A measure of agreement did exist as to the
benefits of a permanent judicial panel, rather than the constantly
shifting clusters of judges characteristic of ad hoc arbitral panels. The
absence of a permanent judiciary was seen by many to render the
rulings of ad hoc tribunals spasmodic, discontinuous, and lacking in
coherence, depriving them of any credible capacity to clarify or develop
the rules of international law. 19
Even this was not invariably regarded as a defect. International
law was largely uncodified, the specific content of its norms having not
developed to anything like the degree of specificity or certainty that
characterized the long-established, comprehensive codes courts in civil
law countries apply. Such of its rules as were settled seemed
unconnected with one another, gaps between them being so wide that
bridging them was seen to afford judges a degree of discretionary
authority many states were reluctant to concede to them.20 Among
some observers, even in the U.S., the discontinuity of awards made by
ad hoc tribunals was a blessing in disguise, precisely because the rules
on which the awards were based applied only to a particular dispute,
without generating anything like precedent or "clarifying" existing rules
and principles. 21
17. Id. at 219.
18. See id. at 215.
19. Cf. JOHN W. FOSTER, ARBITRATION AND THE HAGUE COURT 60-61 (Fred B.
Rothman & Co. 1980) (1904) (discussing the benefits for a permanent arbitration tribunal,
noting especially the increased uniformity).
20. See HERBERT ARTHUR SMITH, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT AS AN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL 118 (Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1920):
[N]o Court of the Nations can possibly satisfy the world unless it administers
a known and written code of international law. On many important
questions of international law there is no general agreement and the actual
practice of nations has in fact differed widely. It cannot be expected that
the nations of the modern world will be willing to leave important rights at
the mercy of judges who are fettered by nothing stricter than their own
predilections.
21. J.M. Dickinson, a prominent American lawyer, had said:
No one ever expected infallibility from any human court Under the
corrective influence of international jurists, unsound doctrine will be
repudiated. There will be a constant change in judges. As new cases
arise, not having any pride of opinion in the decision of others, they will the
more promptly expound as the law that which the enlightenment of the time
shall demand, for international law will always develop and stand as the
78 VOL. 40:1-3
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The feature of the Supreme Court model that appears to have made
the least impact on the Conference and may well have been regarded as
symptomatic of its advocates' naivet6 was its assumption that an
international court which ignores the political consequences of its
decisions - i.e., where the chips fall - could flourish. The idea of
submitting disputes to third-party decision itself represented a
substantial concession from the presumed prerogatives of national
sovereignty. It was tolerable only because - and to the extent that - it
provided an opportunity to resolve international disputes amicably, in a
way the parties could live with, so as to prevent the differences between
them from festering into a justification for war, which often meant
before they could be exploited by domestic political elements.
Nevertheless, if the only models discussed at the 1907 Conference
had been those of diplomatic arbitration and adjudication modeled after
the Supreme Court, respectively, the differences between them might
have been accommodated in a compromise that would have permitted
the would-be court to adopt either approach as circumstances
warranted and the parties to a dispute preferred. But there were not
just two models; there were three. 22 Among small states, both the
adjudicative and the arbitral models were received with skepticism.
With ample historical justification, they suspected that, whatever its
ostensible mission, the proposed court would end up serving the
interests of the great powers unless it embodied the principle of
sovereign equality. This, they made clear, meant that every state party
to a treaty establishing the court had to be empowered to appoint one of
its judges. 23 In essence - and as immediately noted - this would have
endowed the court with the distinctive earmarks of a constituent
assembly.
In the end, the differences between the three models were so
substantial they could not be resolved at the Conference. 24 It concluded
in stalemate, the delegates able to agree only upon a general outline of
exponent of such international justice and morality as the consensus of
nations shall approve.
FOSTER, supra note 19, at 73-74.
22. See A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES 516 (1909).
23. See id.
24. The name by which the court was to be known was itself a subject of contention,
each suggested name being suspected of harboring a hidden institutional agenda. See
WILLIAM I. HULL, THE Two HAGUE CONFERENCES 378-79 (Kraus Reprint Co. 1970) (1908).
The word "court" drew opposition, for example, "Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration" and
"Permanent Institution of Arbitration" being suggested as alternatives. In exasperation,
Joseph H. Choate, head of the U.S. delegation, finally said to the other delegates: "Give us
the baby and you may baptize it as you will!" See JAMES BROWN ScoTT, THE JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 57 (1927). The name finally agreed upon, i.e.,
the Court of Arbitral Justice, was discarded at Versailles. See infra note 27.
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a permanent court and the hope that the differences could be resolved
by diplomatic negotiation.
VERSAILLES AND THE CREATION OF THE PCIJ
But they could not be, and the outbreak of the First World War put
the whole idea of a permanent international court on the backburner
until after its conclusion. When discussions began again, prior to,
during and after the post-war peace conference at Versailles, the
circumstances that had existed in 1907 had changed dramatically.
Versailles was a victors' conference, smaller states participated but
were given few options beyond accepting positions assigned to them by
the powers, which had won the war.2 5
The influence that the U.S. model exerted in the design of the new
international court appears to have peaked during the discussions and
in the recommendations of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, a group
of experts appointed by the League to recommend a plan of organization
for the proposed court. Meeting in The Hague in the summer of 1920,
the Committee adhered closely to the plan Root had promoted in 1907,
causing one American participant to proclaim afterwards that the
Committee's plan was "as closely modeled on the Supreme Court of the
American States as one tribunal can resemble another without being
identical." 26
But the members of the League did not follow all of the Advisory
Committee's recommendations. To be sure, the new court was given the
bland name Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), rather
than that of the Court of Arbitral Justice, as the 1907 Conference had
proposed (and the U.S. had bitterly opposed). 27 It was also kept
separate from the League, at least formally, again in keeping with the
wishes of the U.S., in this instance to leave open the possibility that the
U.S. Senate would consent to U.S. participation in a world court even if
it ultimately rejected U.S. membership in the League itself.2 8
To what extent its name and formal separation from the League
ever motivated the PCIJ's judges or affected the political community's
reactions to their rulings is difficult to say. The separation was more
formal than substantive. The PCIJ's budget still had to be approved by
the Assembly of the League. 29 Of at least equal importance, in order to
25. See ScoTT, supra note 15, at 222.
26. Id. at 221.
27. See SCOTT, supra note 24, at 57; Manley 0. Hudson, The Permanent Court of
Arbitration, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 440, 445 (1933).
28. See Ake Hammarskjold, Sidelights on the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 25 MICH. L. REV. 327, 336 (1927).
29. See id. at 345. The budget of U.S. federal courts has to be approved by Congress,
too, a circumstance that gives Congress influence over them, but not to the extent of
80 VOL. 40:1-3
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break the stalemate that had stymied the 1907 Conference, the
Advisory Committee, at the suggestion of Root and his British
counterpart, Lord Phillimore, recommended and the League
subsequently adopted a compromise under which the judges would be
elected by both the Council of the League, which the big powers were
expected to (and did) control, and the Assembly, where the influence of
the smaller states was expected to be (and was) more substantial, even
decisive. 30
In any event, differences between the PCIJ and the Supreme Court
model were substantial enough to call into question the assumption
that the two institutions were cut from the same cloth or in anything
like the same size. Beyond the absence of a formal institutional
relationship, a crucial difference is that the PCIJ was never accorded
compulsory jurisdiction, much less given political machinery to enforce
its judgments. 31 Either feature would have been an anathema to
perceived prerogatives of national sovereignty. Without them the PCIJ,
and later the ICJ, was destined to hear cases having far less
international significance than ardent advocates of a world court had
hoped for.
Another feature separating the PCIJ, and later the ICJ, from the
Supreme Court model is the authority to render advisory opinions. 32
Early in its own institutional history, the Supreme Court had
determined that giving advice, which can be ignored, is incompatible
with its adjudicative role. The U.S. opposed giving the PCIJ authority
to render advisory opinions for just this reason, as well as because
critics in the U.S. Senate regarded the advisory opinions as a device
designed to circumvent the ostensible denial of compulsory
jurisdiction 33 - that is, by allowing the PCIJ to decide issues important
to specific disputes that the parties were unwilling to submit to
preventing them, inter alia, from overturning congressional legislation they deem to be
incompatible with the Constitution.
30. See Lord Phillimore, Scheme for the Permanent Court of International Justice, 6
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUs SOC'Y 89, 90-91 (1920).
31. Jan Hostie, The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 38 AM. J.
INT'L L. 407, 427 (1944); History, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pl=1&p2=1 (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
32. The final draft of the PCIJ Statute did not mention advisory opinions, the
Assembly having eliminated a draft article that explicitly authorized them. The Covenant
of the League itself did, however, in Article 14. While empowering the Council of the
League to formulate plans for the establishment of the Court, Art. 14 added that "the
Court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the
Council or the Assembly." Early on, the PCIJ decided that since, by virtue of Article 1 of
its Statute it had been established "in accordance with" Article 14 of the Covenant, Article
14 should be considered an integral part of the Statute.
33. Quincy Wright, The United States and the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1927); MANLEY 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 1920-1942, at 510-11 (1943) [hereinafter HUDSON].
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adjudication. As it turned out, advisory opinions became a mainstay of
the PCIJ's case load, proving to be of far greater value than had been
anticipated. 34
Coincidentally, it was one of the Court's advisory opinions that so
severely weakened its standing that it virtually ceased to operate soon
after the opinion was issued. The Customs Regime case was a political
hot potato that the Council of the League sought to avoid by handing it
off to the Court.35 The legal question it presented was whether a
proposed merger of Germany and Austria's customs offices was
consistent with treaty commitments the two countries had made
following their defeat in the war. Formality aside, the decisive question
was whether the proposed customs union was likely to lead to a political
union - a question whose determination entailed an irreducibly political
judgment. The Court was unable to deal decisively with the issue,
much less to settle the underlying dispute. It decided, by a vote of only
eight to seven, that the union was incompatible with an agreement
Austria had made not to compromise its political independence. But
the majority gave few reasons for their opinion, and the minority
included several of the most eminent, learned and impartial members of
the Court. Rightly or not, the ruling left the impression that politics,
not law, had carried the day.36
Like the South West Africa (Namibia) cases decades later, the 1931
Customs Regime case demonstrated that the line separating political
and legal disputes is evanescent, if not utterly illusory, when the
litigants are sovereign nations and the issues are of substantial
importance to them. Virtually all cases an international tribunal hears
have political overtones; the very act of taking a case to an
international court politicizes it.37 That the norms of international law
themselves are not as insulated from politics as conventional wisdom
had assumed was also becoming too obvious to deny in the name of
theoretical constructs.
These changes in perception had been occurring independently of
the work of the PCIJ. As much as anything, they reflect incursions
made by the social sciences in the analysis of law and legal institutions,
long hallowed grounds reserved exclusively to an aristocracy of lawyers
and legal scholars. What initially had taken the form of criticism from
34. See HUDSON, supra note 33, at 513-24.
35. Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 1931 PCIJ
(ser. A/B) No. 41, at 1 (Sept. 5).
36. See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 452 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1967) (1952).
37. See Gilbert Guillaume, The Future of International Judicial Institutions, 44 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 848, 852-53 (1995); see Judicial Settlement of International Disputes:
International Symposium Heidelberg, July 10-12, 1972, 32 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 543,
546 (1972) (remarks by Professor R.Y. Jennings).
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within the ranks of the legal profession - legal realism, as it was known
- expanded into an interdisciplinary recognition that, in the final
analysis, legal concepts and institutions are not nearly as unique as
lawyers and legal scholars maintain; that treating them as unique
serves principally to preserve a professional monopoly; and that the
idea that law and courts of law are unaffected by the social and political
currents in which they swim is untenable.
One of the victims these insights claimed was the idea, originally
considered critical to the Supreme Court model, that the application of
rules of law in a given case can and should be indifferent to how well it
serves the policies the rules were meant to implement. The notion that
an international court can be indifferent to social and political outcomes
suffered a loss in credibility, other than among those who remain wary
of the tendency of policy perspectives to merely rationalize judges'
personal or political biases.38
REORGANIZING THE COURT
The ambiguity of its institutional role notwithstanding, the PCIJ
had been active enough in its first decade to justify hopes that once the
world community reorganized itself after the end of the Second World
War, the Court could be given a new lease on life. 39 If in the final
analysis it had proved to be less than the adjudicative institution the
U.S. had wanted, or the dispute-settling, war-preventing diplomatic
mechanism other states were hoping for, or the constituent assembly
implicit in the principle of sovereign equality applied to the selection of
judges, nonetheless until it came a cropper in the Customs Regime case
it had shown enough promise to justify its continuation.
This, and little more, accounts for the reestablishment of the PCIJ
in the form of the ICJ. In most respects, the language of the ICJ's
constitutive instrument follows that of the PCIJ fairly closely -
conspicuously so. The significance of the Charter's designation of the
ICJ as the UN's "principal judicial organ" is often exaggerated. If it had
been intended to endow the Court with a qualitatively different
institutional role than that of its predecessor, its legislative history
should make the point clearly. It does not. In fact, it suggests only that
by the time the UN was established no purpose would have been served
38. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hargrove, The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of
the Law of Force and Self-Defense, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 143 (1987) ("The business of
courts is to apply the law and preserve the integrity of the legal order, without regard to
any perceptions of the relative power or moral purity of the parties."); and SHABTAI
ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL AND LEGAL
THEORY 62 (1961) ("[I]t cannot be too often emphasized that the Court is a court of justice
and not of ethics or morals or of political expediency.").
39. Over the eighteen years it was formally in operation (1922-1939), the PCIJ heard
twenty-four contentious cases and gave twenty-seven advisory opinions.
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by continuing to maintain a formal separation between the Court and
the world organization with which it was substantively tied anyway.
The implication that either the language of the Charter or the intention
of its framers compels the ICJ to defer to the wishes of the political
organs of the UN represents little more than political ambition
masquerading as original intent.
Whether as a matter of policy the Court should seek to align its
judgments and opinions with those prevailing in the political organs of
the UN, or for that matter with its own perceptions of where humanity's
best interests lie, are very different questions, ones whose answers
must be found, over time, in the world community's reaction to the
Court's assertions of authority and in the Court's own prudential
adjustment to the institutional limitations under which it operates.
Despite the global implications suggested by the word international
in its name, the PCIJ had been a European court. Virtually all the
cases it heard involved the interests of European states, many of the
legal issues arising from changes in legal relationships and obligations
brought about by the outcome of the First World War and treaties
entered into upon its conclusion. The most influential of the PCIJ's
judges were Europeans or European-trained, as well.4 0 In truth, much
of the success the PCIJ enjoyed, and the reassuring familiarity it
presented to its predominantly European target audience, can be
attributed to the mutuality of the judges' legal training, habits of
reasoning and expectations of judicial propriety, and to their familiarity
with the codes and traditions of interpretation that form the bases of
law throughout Europe. 41
These advantages were not available to the ICJ once European
states began establishing regional dispute-settlement institutions soon
after the ICJ itself was established. Litigants and issues which might
once have found their way to the Court were thereafter more apt to be
heard by the European Court of Justice or the European Court of
Human Rights, instead. In contrast to the early experience of its
predecessor, the ICJ, from the outset and for several decades thereafter,
had a very light case load. Members of the Court took to openly
40. See Ole Spiermann, Judge Max Huber at the Permanent Court of International
Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 115, 116 (2007). American nationals were routinely elected to
the Court so as to encourage public opinion in the U.S. to regard the Court as something
other than a threat to U.S. sovereignty. But the absence of the U.S. from both the PCIJ
and the League limited American influence. See SEAN D. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: COPING WITH ANOMALIES 14 (2007),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edulinternationalhrcolloquiumi/ documents/PICT
ProjectlCJPaper.pdf.
41. EDWARD MCWHINNEY, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN
TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE PAUL MARTIN LECTURES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND LAW 66-67 (1987).
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soliciting new cases from governments and from the UN's political
organs. 42 International law associations established blue-ribbon panels
to suggest ways the Court could be made more accessible and attractive
to potential litigants.43
The reluctance of non-European states to fill the void has many
explanations. One, already noted, lies in the suspicion among newly
emerging states that international law, as applied by the ICJ, was too
respectful of the past and the past's allocation of power, wealth and
status, and insufficiently hospitable to perceived contemporary needs,
especially ones entailing the amelioration of inherited inequities. 44 But
another, every bit as influential, was the countervailing perception that
members of the Court were becoming altogether too sensitive to world
politics, and thereby too biased politically to give independent
judgments based solely upon existing rules of law. 45
Given this divergence, and the unresolved conflict among differing
perceptions as to the Court's proper institutional role, it is not
surprising that no consensus has emerged with respect to the qualities
members of the Court should possess or whether it is desirable for them
to have had judicial experience prior to their election to the Court.
Consensus or not, over time, the fact that so many members of the
Court have served in or for their country's foreign ministry, while so
few have had prior judicial experience, has served to reinforce the
impression that the Court is a quasi-political body whose members lack
genuine independence from their governments or the blocs of states
that secure their election.
This perception has been intensified as a result of the unseemly
and demeaning politicking that attends the selection process itself. To
some extent, this is a byproduct of the frequency of elections, a triennial
cadence in which one-third of the Court's fifteen judges are elected
every three years.46 The election process is openly political: candidates
and their foreign office sponsors lobby for months at a time; vote-
trading is commonplace; votes are known to be motivated as much by
42. See, Paul C. Szasz, Enhancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, Vol. II 499, 499-500 (1976)
(discussing the creation of UN organs designed to solicit opinions from International
Court of Justice in order to address the Court's low caseload).
43. The American Society of International Law established two such panels, their
papers published as THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (Leo Gross
ed. 1976), and INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A CROSSROADS (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed. 1987),
respectively.
44. See R.P. Anand, Role of International Adjudication, in THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1, 3-4 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
45. See Thomas R. Hensley, National Bias and the International Court of Justice, 12
MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 568, 568 (1968).
46. Shabtai Rosenne, The Composition of the Court, in THE FUTURE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 337, 377 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
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political considerations as by merit, with little or no distinction made
between the requirements of a judicial and non-judicial post. Worst of
all, the process is almost entirely lacking in public scrutiny or political
accountability. 4 7
The possibility that the selection process would become politicized
had been foreseen in 1920, when the decision was made to give both the
Council and the Assembly of the League a role in the election of the
judges. The Root-Phillimore compromise had recommended that
nominations be made, not by governments themselves, but by groups of
four lawyers each government is free to name to a registry of
individuals available to act as arbitrators, known then and now -
misleadingly - as the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 48 These so-
called National Groups, in turn, were expected to consult with
professional groups within their own country prior to making their
nominations. No one expected the scheme to eliminate political
influence in the choice of nominees or in their election. But it was
hoped that the professional standing of individuals who are deemed to
be qualified to act as arbitrators would ensure that greater attention
would be given to the professional qualifications of candidates for the
Court than would be likely if governments were left to make the
nominations themselves. 49
The recommendation found its way into the constitutive
instrument of the PCIJ, and later that of the ICJ, but as an option, not
a requirement.50 It is still there, but is all but ignored in practice, even
by governments like the U.S. that adhere to the formula in form, but
reduce the role of their National Group to that of bit players or that
name to the Group persons so closely tied to their governments that the
distinction between the two is inconsequential.5 1 As much as the
elections themselves, the breakdown of the system intended to assure
independent screening of nominees detracts from the capacity of the
47. For an empirically-based analysis of these and similar shortcomings in
international judicial elections, see RUTH MACKENZIE, KATE MALLESON, PENNY MARTIN &
PHILLIPPE SANDS, SELECTING INTERNATIONAL JUDGES: PRINCIPLE, PROCESS, AND POLITICS
1 (2010) [hereinafter MACKENZIE ET AL.].
48. S.K. VERMA, AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 342 (2004).
49. See SCOTT, supra note 15, at 229.
50. Stephen M. Schwebel, National Judges and Judges Ad Hoc of the International
Court of Justice, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 899, 891, 899 (1999).
51. The U.S. National Group that in 2010 nominated the State Department's
Principal Deputy Legal Adviser, Joan Donohue, for a place on the ICJ consisted of the
Department's Legal Adviser, two of his predecessors in that post, and a former Deputy
Legal Adviser.
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judges' own professional standing to imbue their rulings with a
compelling authority. 52
The onset of the Cold War, coming as it did at the same time as the
UN and the ICJ were being established, had something to do with the
politicization of elections to the Court. It froze many of the leading
states into rival blocs, intensified the political ramifications of
everything that went on at the UN, and led to the nomination by some
states of candidates whose lack of independence from their government
was virtually taken for granted.53  Ironically, the proliferation of
international tribunals since the end of the Cold War seems only to
have compounded the problem, having transformed what had been a
small judicial elite into a sizeable professional corps such that, as one
group of scholars put it recently, for lawyers in foreign offices and
international organizations an international judgeship has become "a
natural part of career progression." 54
EXPANSION AND PROLIFERATION
Among the most critical factors bearing upon the evolution of the
ICJ to this point has been the unprecedented expansion in the scope of
claims made in the name of international law, the degree of
specialization that has come with it, and an acceptance within the
international law community of a degree of discretionary authority in
judicial interpretation that might once have been considered
overreaching. In theory, these developments should open up a vast new
array of issues for the Court to resolve.55 In practice, this has not yet
happened to the extent one might have expected, in part because so
many of the issues international law now raises are being handled by
specialized dispute-settlement mechanisms like the International
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the appellate body of the
World Trade Organization, the International Criminal Court and ad
hoc criminal tribunals. 56
52. MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 47, at 64-66. In contrast, the professional
qualifications of the members of the PCIJ were never questioned. WALTERS, supra note
36, at 170.
53. See Michael Reisman, Judge Shigeru Oda: Reflections on the Formation of a
Judge, in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE SHIGERU ODA 57, 68 (2002).
54. MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 47, at 58.
55. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT
THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 1-2 (1999).
56. The high visibility enjoyed by some of these tribunals and the cases they hear
attenuates the image the Court once enjoyed as international law's central adjudicative
instrumentality. One cannot help but observe that, in contrast to what one would have
found at the time the South West Africa (Namibia) cases were decided, the ICJ is seldom
referred to these days as the World Court or even the World Court.
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The expansion of international criminal law is especially significant
in this respect, but so, less dramatically, is the expansion in claims
being made in the name of the rights and obligations of individuals and
other non-state actors. Generally speaking, these subjects are
independent of the rights and obligations of states as such, and since,
other than through requests for advisory opinions, only states have
access to the ICJ, they are being raised in forums other than court.
Knowing this, the UN's political organs by now might have acceded
to requests to increase accessibility to the Court or to install it at the
head of a hierarchy of international courts. They have chosen not to do
so, however, instead creating ever more courts, even in the face of
arguments that proliferation could lead to a fragmentation of
international law.5 7 It is not beyond the realm of possibility, in fact,
that some foreign offices find the prospect of fragmentation appealing,
and are disinclined for this reason alone to establish a judicial
hierarchy. Seen from the perspective of political power, after all,
institutions like the Court are useful when they lend compelling legal
authority to political will, but only so long as their authority is
insufficient to enable them to question the legitimacy of that will when
it conflicts with fundamental community standards or goals. Blocs of
small states are every bit as likely as powerful states to proclaim their
adherence to international law while resisting any attempt to endow
the judicial system with sufficient authority to apply it to their own
actions.
In any event, while the proliferation of international tribunals may
increase the risk of fragmentation, it also raises the possibility that, if
only for reasons of collective professional or bureaucratic self-interest,
proliferation could lead to cross-fertilization, not only in the headiest
realms of jurisprudence but in routine matters of practice and
procedure as well. If so, it could end up endowing international law
with a degree of cohesion - and thereby authority - it has never before
had.
It is not difficult, in fact, to envision the emergence of a global
common law - a judicially constructed common law, not one pronounced
by academics, theologians or apologists for governments, as has been
true throughout much of international law's post-Westphalian history.
The absence of a structural hierarchy among international tribunals
57. E.g., Thomas Buergenthal, Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is
It Good or Bad?, 14 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 267, 272 (2001); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger
of Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 791, 792 (1999); Jonathan I. Charney, Impact on the International Legal System of
the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 698
(1999).
88 VOL. 40:1-3
THE ICJ: ON ITS OWN
does not preclude appreciation of the mutual benefits that symmetry
can bring.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The obscurity into which the Court seemed to have fallen after the
South West Africa (Namibia) cases proved to be ephemeral. It hears
more cases today that it ever has.5 8 Whether this reflects an increase in
confidence, though, is problematical. Some cases submitted to the
Court appear to be motivated less by a desire to clarify legal rights than
by a desire to obtain diplomatic cover for practical solutions the parties
are willing to accept anyway. The ICJ is not likely to be an effective
deterrent to the use of military power by militarily powerful states
determined to have their way or to play a decisive role in the settlement
of inter-state disputes threatening world peace.
But the very breadth of its mission affords the Court an
opportunity to amalgamate and blend evolving elements of
international law that specialized tribunals do not possess. Ironically,
this attribute, aided by the ambiguity of the Court's role, could end up
providing it with a central position inverse to its loss of glamour. As it
matures according to the requirements of international life, the Court
may find itself inadvertently well-positioned to fashion an institutional
life of its own making.
58. Douglass Cassel, Is There a New World Court?, 1 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. iii, vi
(2003).
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